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本文为远东资信研究院副院长张林为South China Morning Post（南华早报）撰写的英文评论，文章梳理介绍了近四十年来的四次“国运”如何帮助中国经济转危为机，也解释了为何中国经济的韧性始终超越理论预测。文章指出，当前中国经济正处于第四次“国运”之中，一方面是国内技术进步正从外部技术溢出切换为外部技术封锁的“逆向激励”，另一方面是东盟国家的制造业升级对冲了对美出口收缩的部分影响。

4 Times Fortune Has Favoured China’s Economic Rise

History is often shaped by coincidences. 

Over the past four decades, China has emerged as one of the world's most successful economies—and also one of the luckiest. Repeatedly, just as tensions with the United States and other Western powers escalated, unexpected black swan events intervened, helping China navigate through diplomatic and economic difficulties. 

These pivotal moments of fortune have occurred at least four times since the 1990s.

The first occurred around 1990, when China was confronting severe sanctions from the West. Just then, Japan’s real estate bubble burst, plunging its economy into recession, and driving it to seek opportunities in China. By attracting Japanese direct investment and importing Japanese technology, China gained crucial knowledge in sectors like color televisions, automobiles, and telecommunications—laying the groundwork for its industrial modernization.

At the same time, the First Gulf War in 1991 diverted U.S. attention, while the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s own reform and opening-up reshaped Western strategic priorities. China not only broke through the Western blockade in a very short term, but also accelerated its shift toward an export-led economy.

The second stroke of luck came after a series of confrontations—including the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade—that severely strained U.S.-China relations. 

During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush labeled China a “strategic competitor”, and the April 2001 spy plane collision further escalated military tensions, brought the two nations to the brink of military conflict. Yet the September 11 attacks months later refocused U.S. strategy entirely, which also leading to cooperation with China in the fight against terrorism. This paved the way for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).

From 2001 to 2007, China integrated deeply into global supply chains and experienced its fastest economic growth, since the reform and opening-up era. When the 2008 global financial crisis struck, China responded with a massive 4 trillion yuan stimulus and a ten-industry revitalization plan, expanding its domestic manufacturing capacity and solidifying its position as the world’s factory.

By 2009, China became the largest exporter globally; a year later, it overtook Japan as the second-largest economy. That same year, China’s manufacturing value-added surpassed that of the United States for the first time.

After weathering the subprime crisis, the U.S. “pivot to Asia” took shape in 2011 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was finalized in 2016. At the same time, China was struggling with overcapacity—a side effect of its earlier stimulus. Had the TPP been implemented, the pressure on China's economy from external demand might have intensified.

But the Trump administration withdrew from the TPP and other international agreements, marked another turning point. In China, Trump was jokingly referred to as “Comrade Builder”, for he seemingly undermining U.S. influence, and handing over the banner of free trade to China.

Yet, Trump had his own strategy: during his first term, he designated China as the primary strategic competitor and imposed significant tariffs on Chinese goods starting in 2018. The subsequent Biden administration intensified efforts to contain China in high-tech sectors, policies like “small yard, high fence”, “China+1”, “friend-shoring”, and “near-shoring”, aimed to limit China’s technological rise—yet another phase of great-power competition.

However, the global pandemic in 2020 brought China its third stroke of luck. The pandemic disrupted production in Europe and the U.S., severely impacting global supply and industrial chains. China, however, was the only major economy capable of quickly resuming normal production, with state-owned manufacturing employees working in isolation at factories.

Meanwhile, stimulus programs in Europe and the U.S. further boosted consumer demand, creating a supply-demand imbalance during the pandemic. Against this backdrop, China’s exports surged between 2020 and 2022, with export growth rates of 3.6%, 29.6%, and 5.6%, respectively. In 2020, China was the only major economy to record positive GDP growth, and in 2021, its GDP growth rebounded to 8.6%.

Post-pandemic, China faced its true economic challenges. To address the risks of local government debt from large-scale infrastructure projects, and household debt from extensive real estate development, China has begun deep adjustments to the real estate market, which has triggered profound changes in the balance sheets of both the household and government sectors. Additionally, Trump’s second term has introduced even tougher trade challenges and high-tech export restrictions targeting China.

Thus, China’s economy faces dual pressures: internal balance sheet contraction from both households and local governments, and external demand shrinkage. In theory, this combination could trigger an economic recession, posing the greatest challenge to China’s economy in four decades.

Yet once again, fortune intervened. First, in the semiconductor and chip sectors, the unintended consequences of the U.S.’s strategy have begun to surface. While this strategy has made it harder for technology to spill over to China, it has also left domestic market to its local companies.

With a vast user base and substantial financial investment—such as the 12 trillion yuan pledged by Chinese government investment funds—progress in high-tech manufacturing has become almost inevitable, not merely a matter of luck. Since 2020, Chinese companies in electronic design automation (EDA) and artificial intelligence have grown rapidly, possibly benefiting from the “reverse incentive” of technological blockades. 

For the semiconductor industry, the U.S.’s choice to impose blockades rather than flood the market with cheap products, may represents a significant strategic misstep.

Second, the rapid upgrading of ASEAN’s manufacturing sector has been a boon. For instance, after excluding re-export trade, Vietnam’s electronics and information product exports grew by 37.1% in the first half of 2025, while Malaysia’s electrical machinery and parts exports rose by 13.3%.

ASEAN’s manufacturing upgrades have increased its reliance on importing intermediate goods, raw materials, and equipment from China. Currently, China’s exports to ASEAN surpass those to the U.S., meaning that any shortfall in exports to the U.S. is likely to be offset by demand from ASEAN. For example, from January to August this year, China’s exports to the U.S. contracted by 15.5% year-on-year, while exports to ASEAN grew by 15.8%.

In conclusion, while China’s economy faces unprecedented challenges, it appears far more resilient than theoretical predictions would suggest. This resilience seems to stem from the fact that luck continues to favor China’s economy.

zhanglin@fecr.com.cn

The views expressed are his own.